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Recent Decisions
TORTs-GOVERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY-LEGAL PROCESS-ROLE OF
COURTS IN MODIFYING THE LAw-The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
assumed an active role in eliminating governmental tort immunity by
holding that municipal corporations are not immune from tort liabil-
ity arising out of the operation of motor vehicles, where the prior im-
munity had not been fixed by specific legislation.
Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
Plaintiff-appellant was injured in an accident involving a police vehicle
of the City of Omaha, Nebraska, a municipal corporation of that state.
Plaintiff brought suit against the city and was denied recovery as Ne-
braska had no specific legislation permitting recovery against a munici-
pal corporation for the negligence of its employees in the operation of
government owned vehicles pursuant to their duties.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed, holding that
tort immunity would no longer attach to municipal corporations and
other governmental subdivisions with respect to actions arising from
their ownership, use and operation of motor vehicles.
Three members of the court supporting the holding joined in an
opinion' which set forth the view that sovereign tort immunity has
been a development of the common law, and therefore courts may
modify or eliminate the doctrine in a case-by-case evolution to the
extent that no inconsistency with any specific legislative pronounce-
ment arises. The court further was careful to make its rule prospective
except in those instances where a government entity had, prior to the
date of the decision, been covered by liability insurance; the limit of
retrospective liability imposed by the court for those units of govern-
ment affected was to be set by the amount of insurance protection in
each instance. Of significance to courts of other jurisdictions is the cau-
tious evolutionary approach of the Supreme Court of Nebraska toward
new social policy as the mechanics of change are affected by the deli-
cate balance between the judiciary and the legislature.
Sovereign tort immunity has a checkered American history with the
legitimacy of its birth2 and the logic of its continued survival3 ques-
I. Three justices joined in the opinion of the court; three, including the Chief
Justice, dissented; one concurred in the result.
2. Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the juris-
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tioned on numerous occasions. The development of the doctrine of
governmental immunity from tort liability has generally been accom-
plished through decisional law, and the basic concept of immunity of
state government has been accepted in many states as axiomatic with-
out questioning the underlying rationale. 4 This appears to have been
the situation in Nebraska, and in the instant case Justice Carter, in his
dissent, relied upon a state constitutional provision which implied a
waiver of immunity" to urge that the provision is not self implemented
and therefore immunity, which he considered inherent, could be
waived only by legislative action.- The extension of tort immunity to
municipal corporations and other governmental subdivisions has been
based on the view that they are agents of the state. 7
With the increasing involvement of government in activities and
services that were once only provided, if at all, by private sources,
courts in a number of jurisdictions developed a distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions. The former being those
diction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it came to be applied in the
United States of America, where the prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries
of legal evolution. Admitting its application to the sovereign and its illogical ascrip-
tion as an attribute of sovereignty generally, it is not easy to appreciate its applica-
tion to the United States, where the location of sovereignty-undivided sovereignty,
as orthodox theory demands-is a difficult undertaking. . . .The federal government
is one of delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the Con-
stitution, as demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments.
That brings us to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the
American electorate or the people. Thus, we are led to the conclusion that the
prerogative of the King's immunity from the jurisdiction and alleged resulting
infallibility, the apotheosis of absolutism, have by evolution devolved upon the
democratic American people, presumably both as citizens of the States and of the
United States. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1924).
3. See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Coinnion-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,
16 ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937); Hink & Schutter, Some Thoughts on the American Law of
Governmental Tort Liability, 20 RUTGERS L. REV.' 710 (1966).
4. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812), first engrafted the rule
relating to governmental sub-units in a manner similar to the post American Revolu-
tion case extending immunity beyond the King in England, (Russell v. Men of Devon,
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)) as a matter of simple expedience; it is evident, for example,
that the rule was accepted in Arizona as a matter of course where the court said in
adopting the rule, "[a]s to this question it is well settled by the great weight of authority
that the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, is immune from prosecution in the
courts and from liability to respond in damages for negligence .... " State v. Sharp, 21
Ariz. 424, 189 P. 631, 632 (1920).
5. NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 22, "The state may sue and be sued, and the legislature
shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought."
6. "But whether or not the rule of the state's sovereign immunity from suit origi-
nated under the common law of England or whether or not it was judge made or merely
declared, is of little consequence in this case for the simple reason that it has been
preserved to the state by the Constitution. Article V, Section 22, of the Constitution
of Nebraska . . . is not self executing" 160 N.W.2d at 812.
7. Burke v. City of South Omaha, 79 Neb. 793, 113 N.W. 241 (1907).
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activities of government where tort immunity prevailed, and the latter
being the business of government upon which liability was imposed.
Such had been the approach in Nebraska prior to the instant case.,
Pennsylvania courts have also followed this course.9
The classifications, "governmental" and "proprietary" appear to be
better defined by their results than by the existence of identifiable ele-
ments comprising them. 10 The experience of Pennsylvania is not atyp-
ical of jurisdictions which have used the distinction to limit to some
extent the tort immunity of municipal corporations and other govern-
ment entities. Use of the distinction once permitted a plaintiff hit by
a city electric repair truck to recover" while recovery was denied a
plaintiff struck by a city garbage truck; 12 and two Pennsylvania deci-
sions in a single year would permit the observation that a "governmen-
tal" garbage truck could deliver refuse to either a "governmental" in-
cinerator"a or to a "proprietary" garbage dump.' 4
Despite the growth of the governmental tort immunity doctrine by
the common law vehicle of court decisions, courts have been reluctant
to curtail or abolish it and have, in part, relied upon the view that it
should be the role of the legislature to alter a doctrine of such longev-
ity.15 The dissent in the instant case argued against judicial abrogation
of the rule because of its longevity and urged that the legislature,
through some legislation touching the subject, had pre-empted the
field. Justice Newton dissenting observed:
[T]he doctrine of governmental immunity is an ancient one and
well rooted in the common law of this country .... the rule has
been suspended or waived in numerous instances specified by the
Legislature. One of the better known exceptions is that authoriz-
8. Greenwood v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 142, 55 N.W.2d 343 (1952), "governmental"
weed burning; Stadler v. Curtis Gas, Inc., 182 Neb. 6, 151 N.W.2d 915 (1967), "pro-
prietary" building rental.
9. In Pennsylvania after a beginning which suggested the possibility of municipal
corporation liability (Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W&S 545 (Pa. 1843)), the court
adopted a "governmental-proprietary" test in Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324
(1860).
10. In California use of the "governmental-proprietary" test permitted recovery by
one injured while attending a community theatre in a public park, Rhodes v. City of
Palo Alto, 100 Cal. App. 2d 336, 223 P.2d 639 (1950), (proprietary); while recovery was
not permitted by one injured in a children's playground, Farrell v. City of Long Beach,
132 Cal. App. 2d 818, 283 P.2d 296 (1955) (governmental).
11. Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492, 31 A. 728 (1895).
12. Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 A. 273 (1924).
13. Kunz v. Titusville, 373 Pa. 528, 97 A.2d 42 (1953).
14. Hill v. Allentown Housing Authority, 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d 519 (1953).
15. See Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d
606 (1964).
470
Vol. 7: 468, 1969
Recent Decisions
ing recovery where injuries or damage is sustained by reason of
negligent and defective maintenance of highways. The destruction
of that doctrine will require an extensive overhauling- of all our
laws bearing on the duties and responsibilities of these entities in
the field of torts. . . . The Legislature alone, certainly not this
court, can adequately cope with the situation. a6
A similar attitude appears to dominate the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court which in a 1966 opinion stated, when denying recovery against
a school district, that, "[e]ven though the doctrine of municipal immu-
nity from tort liability was initially imposed by judicial decision....
we are reluctant to abolish this doctrine by judicial fiat.' '17
Other states, notably New York and Illinois, have, by constitution
or statute, eliminated governmental tort immunity or provided a
mechanism for recovery from the state.' 8 And in most jurisdictions
some exceptions, e.g. limited liability19 or waiver of immunity by the
purchase of liability insurance 20 to general governmental tort immu-
nity have been provided. In Pennsylvania, however, the argument that
an insured governmental entity should be held to have waived immu-
nity has been rejected. By relying on the "governmental-proprietary"
doctrine, waiver of immunity through purchase of liability insurance
has been avoided upon the notion that the insurance protects only
against the potential of liability incurred while engaging in a "propri-
etary" function. 2 1
In a few states the courts have attempted to abolish governmental
tort immunity. In most, the apparent elimination of immunity was
suggested only to be thereafter followed by retreat either through fac-
tual distinctions narrowing the abolition to the strictest agreement
16. 160 N.W.2d at 811.
17. Dillon v. York City School District, 422 Pa. 103, 105, 220 A.2d 896, 897 (1966).
18. For example in New York liability is imposed and a constitutional Court of
Claims is provided. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 23; N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 1 et seq. (McKinney
1963). The extent of governmental liability in New York can be measured by the case
of Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), where in the death
of an informer the decedent's survivors recovered from the City of New York for failure
to provide adequate police protection; in Illinois a mechanism for recovery, but no
abolition of immunity, obtains through a statutory Court of Claims. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, § 439.1 (1967).
19. In Wisconsin liability is imposed up to a $25,000 limit. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.43(2)
(1967).
20. In several states (Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, North Caro-
lina, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee) coverage by liability insurance operates as a
waiver of governmental tort immunity. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1959).
21. Supler v. North Franklin Township School District, 407 Pa. 657, 182 A.2d 535
(1962).
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with the case first decided 2 or by moving back to the nebulous doc-
trine of "governmental-proprietary" distinctions.23 In California and
Arizona, however, the courts flatly abolished governmental tort immu-
nity.24 Legislative response in the California situation was swift to
reinstate a doctrine of general immunity for the government with cer-
tain exceptions. 25 In Arizona, despite whatever legislative concern may
exist, governmental tort liability remains.
In Pennsylvania the highest court's principal proponent for the abo-
lition of governmental tort immunity was the late Justice Musmanno.
In 1954 he filed the only dissenting opinion in Boorse v. Springfield
Township,26 wherein he observed that despite the disparity between
the underlying historical basis for governmental immunity and the
theory of democratic institutions the doctrine has been retained. 27 In
1966, while a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
relax the doctrine although terming the reasons for its existence
anachronistic, 2 Justice Musmanno, joined by Justice Roberts sepa-
rately reiterated his position favoring abolition of the doctrine with the
comment that, "[i]t is a vain hope that some other branch of govern-
ment will accept the task which is strictly that of the judiciary ... it is
an improper hope .. . that the Legislature will take over a responsibility
which resides in the courts. 2 9 In 1967 these two justices again urged
the court to abolish governmental tort immunity.30 In Pennsylvania
abolition of governmental tort immunity appears no more imminent
in 1969 than in 1954.
22. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961), later limited by
Stevens v. City of St. Clair Shores, 366 Mich. 341, 115 N.W.2d 69 (1962).
23. In Colorado Racing Com'n. v. Brush Racing Assn., 136 Colo. 287, 289, 316 P.2d
582, 585 (1957), the court stated that, "[i]n Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a
proper subject for discussion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge
in this Court .. "; but the same court in Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590
(1960), applied the doctrine of immunity to "governmental" functions of a county.
24. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Stone
v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 381, 384 P.2d 107 (1963).
25. For a detailed analysis of the California experience see Van Alstyne, Govern-
mental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1963).
26. 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954).
27. Id. at 119, 103 A.2d at 713.
28. Justice Jones speaking for the majority in Dillon v. York City School District,
stated that "[e]ven though the reasons for originating governmental immunity are now
anachronistic, the Commonwealth may wish to sustain the rule for other, more modern,
reasons. Only the legislature can deal with the field of immunity in all of its . . .
aspects by enacting a comprehensive bill. . . .On the other hand, we must continue
to be confronted with the problem on the most fragmented basis." 422 Pa. 103, 106, 220
A.2d 896, 898 (1966).
29. Id. at 108, 220 A.2d at 900.
30. Husser v. School District of Pittsburgh, 425 Pa. 249, 254, 228 A.2d 910, 912 (1967).
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Total abolition of the doctrine as in Arizona, or retention of the
doctrine though admittedly dissatisfied with it but waiting for another
branch of government to act, are not the only choices for a court of
last resort faced with the question. The Supreme Court of Nebraska,
cognizant of this background and particularly attuned to the California
experience, has attempted to steer a cautious course with reduced like-
lihood of legislative reversal. While the court announced its disposi-
tion to broadly abolish governmental tort immunity, it did not sug-
gest that it was doing so by a single case as had Arizona and California.
Whether the change will proceed in Nebraska or stop by judicial re-
treat or legislative intervention remains to be seen, but the Nebraska
court has made an initial measured probe toward a governmental re-
sponsibility heretofore avoided.
If the courts must assume the role of adjusting the law of govern-
mental tort liability to a position more compatible with those concepts
of spreading the risk which now, more than two hundred years ago,
appear to be favored by society then it is suggested that the approach
of the Nebraska court best recognizes the realities of divided power
under state constitutions and is therefore most reasonable. Irrespective
of the merits of total abolition of governmental tort immunity any broad
abolition of that immunity by the judiciary may be avoided by a leg-
islature made uneasy by a sudden change to a body of law which has
existed for so long and carries a suggestion of economic importance.
And the potential economic consequence of abolition of the doctrine
provides one of the most forceful arguments for retention of the im-
munity.3 '
While attempting to define the proper role of the judiciary in tort
law reform several writers have urged that the premise that legislatures
are better qualified to alter tort law and are more closely responsive to
the broad needs of society in this area is invalid.3 2 One writer has
examined the character, workload and motivation of legislators and
points out the external pressures that influence legislative action. It is
suggested that legislatures are indisposed to act except in response to
immediate pressures. Since it is evident that tort victims do not form
a monolithic lobby (People do not think of themselves as future tort
31. 160 N.W.2d 810.
32. Peck, The Role of Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN.
L. REV. 265 (1964); Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of
Appellate Courts, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1254 (1966); Comment, The Role of the Courts in
Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DuKE L.J. 888.
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victims, and past injuries are past.), there is no strong force to cause the
public organization of a lobby to press for legislative reform of tort
law. Any pressure for reform comes case-by-case as injured plaintiffs
seek recovery in the courts. This is in striking contrast with the con-
tinuing pressure applied by commercial interests, and it is pointed out
that this may explain why most state legislatures have willingly enacted
legislation such as the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform
Photographic Copies as Evidence Act while an extremely limited num-
ber have enacted the Uniform Joint Tortfeasors Act, or the other three
uniform tort-related acts of the more than 100 uniform and model acts
approved by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws.83
The apparent view of any lobby interest in tort legislation would be
directed at limiting any change, and therefore could be effective in the
legislative committee system where tort law reforms could be disposed
of by delay and failure to bring bills to the floor and to public atten-
tion. Consequently it has been argued that if courts would act to change
tort law even in the face of possible legislative reversal, it would force
legislatures to speak. And should the legislature intervene to re-establish
governmental tort immunity-it would have to do so by public action
rather than by committee inaction. This would tend to force the mat-
ter to public attention, and perhaps a more critical view would be
taken of the issue and a position truly responsive to the needs and de-
sires of society could result.34
The thesis of writers who urge judicial tort reform seems to be that
the legislatures are not better qualified than courts to reform the law of
torts; that even though the legislature could in theory develop a com-
prehensive tort reform bill it will not do so; and that tort law reform
is a proper, if not exclusive, province of the courts.
The courts of many jurisdictions have actively participated in some
tort law reform overturning precedents on subjects ranging from men-
tal suffering to privity.85 All but those cases involving immunities focus
attention on the plaintiff's injury, and the analysis below will examine
the role of the courts in the abolition of governmental immunity with
the judicial role in the adoption of a doctrine of comparative negli-
33. Peck, supra note 32, at 284.
34. Id. at 286.
35. Keeton, supra note 32, at 1257 cites changes in twenty classes of subject matter
in over half the states covering more than ninety decisions during the period 1960-65.
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gence.38 Abolition of governmental immunity may be distinguished
from the other aspects of tort law reform.
While it may be shown that the courts are not barred from making
changes to tort law, that is not enough. Comparative negligence for in-
stance and governmental tort liability are not concepts imbued with an
identical public interest. Changing the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence is somewhat more akin to changing a rule of evidence than it is
to changing the governmental immunity doctrine. The former involves
changing the relative harm or benefit to the parties before the court;
it does not directly affect the remainder of society. Changing from a
doctrine of contributory negligence to one of comparative negligence
merely reflects an awareness of the uncertainty of factual determina-
tions. The plaintiff has been injured. Some situation created by the
defendant and the plaintiff (perhaps his mere presence) was the pre-
cursor to the injury. By adopting the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence a court is only indicating its reticence to deny an injured
plaintiff any recovery when the defendant was negligent and it can-
not be known in an absolute sense that the plaintiff caused his own
injury.
In contrast the question of governmental immunity goes to the issue
of assessment of damages against a special type of defendant rather
than to the determination of fault. It is affected not so much by an
interest in the right of a plaintiff to be made whole but rather by the
wisdom of requiring payment by the society generally. The nature of
this public policy question seems likely to place the issue at the fringe
of the judicial domain while the issue of comparative negligence seems
well within appropriate court purview. That the power to appropriate
public monies and the power of taxation are in the legislature suggests
that a court would be acting near the limit of its powers vis-4-vis the
legislature if it should choose to abolish governmental tort immunity.
Yet logically a court could so act if it may view the doctrine as one of
court made law.
While it is well for a court choosing to actively participate in tort
law reform to signal its intent to ultimately abolish all governmental
tort immunity, it need not offend the power of the legislature nor in-
vite application of that power by making any decision more broad
36. See, James, Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone, and Wade, Comments on Maki v.
Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?,
21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
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than necessary to the adjudication of the specific case presented. In a
common law jurisdiction and in the absence of specific constitutional
or statutory provisions to the contrary the highest court of that jurisdic-
tion could abolish the rule of governmental tort immunity utilizing the
rationale that if the reason for this common law rule is gone (or if it
never rationally existed) the rule should also go. The court's power
may only be tempered by its balance of power with the other branches
of government, but if the court is to insure that any transition to gov-
ernmental tort liability will be steady and orderly it must move with
caution as did the court in the instant case.
E. Kears Pollock
REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD-TENANT-RENT WITHHOLDING AcT-The
Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the Rent Withholding Act
does not immunize from eviction tenants who have failed to pay rent
into an escrow fund in a timely manner.
The National Council of the Junior Order of United American
Mechanics of the United States of North America v. Roberson, 214
Pa. Super. 9, 248 A.2d 861 (1969).
Plaintiff landlord and defendant tenants entered into a month-to-
month written lease in October, 1967. Defendants paid the rent for
four months, but in February, 1968, were notified by the Allegheny
County Health Department1 and the Bureau of Building Inspectors
of the City of Pittsburgh that the property occupied by them was
eligible for rent withholding under the Pennsylvania Rent Withhold-
1. The communication, in part, read:
Under State law, a Rent Withholding Program has been designed to encourage
landlords to make needed repairs. If you choose to use this plan, you will continue
to pay your rent, only instead of paying it to your landlord you would pay it into
an Escrow Account at Mellon Bank. You will continue to pay rent to Mellon Bank
until you have been notified by the Allegheny County Health Department that the
needed repairs have been made, following a reinspection of the property in your
presence.
If, after six months, the needed repairs have not been made and properly certi-
fied, the money remaining in the Escrow Account would be paid back to you.
Should you decide to withhold your rent, please appear immediately at the
Allegheny County Health Department, Room 649, City-County Building, telephone
number 281-4900, extension 784. If you want to use this program, it is important
that you act quickly since the law protects you against eviction only while you are
paying your rent into the Escrow Account.
214 Pa. Super. 9, 11, 248 A.2d 861, 862-63. (The concurring opinions appear in 249 A.2d
828.)
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